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Introduction
Surveys of the state of the world economy in the early
1980s have painted a sombre picture of conditions in
the Third World. In many developing countries,
output has stagnated since the late 1970s, and the
economic recovery experienced by the industrialised
countries to date has been insufficient to spur
widespread economic growth. The World Bank
reported that the terms of trade faced by most
developing countries in 1982 were the worst in the
post-World War II period, while the United Nations
predicted that in many countries, per capita income
would continue its decline [World Bank 1984: 26; UN
1983: 1-8].
Although the situation confronting the Third World
has become particularly disadvantageous since the
end of the l970s, the failure of many Third World
governments to set their countries on a path of self-
sustaining economic growth has been evident for a
long time. A number of reasons for this failure have
been advanced, including inequality within and
among countries, adverse global economic conditions
and waste of resources. Some analysts believe that
expenditure on the security sector is an important
factor.' They argue that if security expenditures could
be reduced and the resources thus released could be
invested productively, economic growth and develop-
ment would be promoted.
In determining which factors perpetuate under-
development, it is clearly necessary to consider both
internal and external conditions. No one factor or
group of factors can be considered a sufficient
explanation. Hence reducing expenditure on the
security sector will not by itself alter economic
development prospects significantly. Taken in con-
In this article, the terms 'security sector' and 'security expenditure'
are employed in preference to the more commonly used 'military
sector' and 'military expenditure' to indicate the inclusion of
paramilitary forces in the discussion. This usage also reflects the fact
that Third World governments frequently use their armed forces to
maintain themselves in power, that is. to promote regime security;
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junction with other changes, however, it may have a
much more significant impact.
The Data Problem
The first problem in assessing how reduced security
expenditure can contribute to economic development
is the lack of reliable data. Data on a wide variety of
economic and social conditions in developing
countries are often difficult to come by, and security
expenditure is no exception. How much of its
resources a country devotes to security-related
activities is often considered sensitive, and is therefore
cloaked with secrecy. One reason why governments
are reluctant to discuss their security outlays openly is
to prevent potential opponents from knowing too
much about their military establishments. At the same
time, however, the secrecy with which governments
surround security issues is often designed to prevent
their own citizens from learning too much about them.
But not all developing countries attempt to obscure
their security spending, nor are they the only ones to
do so. Eastern-bloc countries also provide extremely
limited information on their security outlays.
Nonetheless, there are a number of sources that
provide information on the military-related com-
ponent of government, for a broad spectrum of
countries. The best known annual publications are the
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's
(ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute's (SIPRI) Wor/dArmaments andDisarmament:
SIPRI Yearbook, the International Monetary Fund's
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and the
International Institute of Strategic Studies' (IISS) The
Military Balance. In addition, many Third World
countries publish their own data in budget estimates
and final expenditure accounts, Data published by
national governments are, however, frequently
considered suspect, as researchers and other analysts
assume that governments conceal large portions of
their security budgets from public scrutiny. While it is
true that concealment occurs, on quite a large scale in
some cases, it is wrong to assume that the data
provided in the international sources mentioned
above are any more reliable, since the organisations
which are responsible for these publications receive
their information directly or indirectly from national
governments.
There is often considerable variation among these
sources, due in part to the different definitions of
security expenditure adopted by individual national
governments and the various organisations which
collect security expenditure data. The IISS has no
definition and accepts whatever figure national
sources provide. While ACDA and SIPRI have their
own definitions of what constitutes security expendi-
ture, in practice these two organisations do little more
than reproduce data provided in one form or another
by governments. Both increasingly use the ¡MF as the
source of the data they publish, because the ¡MF
definition is the most inclusiv, ¡MF members being
supposed to take it into account when supplying
budget information to the Fund.
The definitional question is not trivial, [see Ball 1984:
1-15] since security expenditure can easily be listed in
national budgets under civilian ministries. In Iran, for
example, expenditure on the paramilitary Gendarmerie
has sometimes been included under the Ministry of
Defence and sometimes under the Ministry of the
Interior. For the IMF, this should not have posed a
problem, since the Iranian government ought to have
reported expenditure on the Gendarmerie irrespective
of where it was listed in the budget. Any other source
which has simply reported the figures listed under
Ministry of Defence will produce an expenditure series
which has serious internal inconsistencies. Conversely,
not all expenditure listed in the defence budgets of
developing countries is defence-related. In Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan, for example, civil aviation is
funded through the Ministry of Defence.
The data produced by the IMF are probably the most
consistent and comparable of the data collected by the
four organisations mentioned above. It must be
realised, however, that this is no guarantee of their
accuracy because governments often fail to report
portions of their security budgets to the fund.2 The
Just how inaccurate ¡MF data ace is a matter of some debate. In a
recently published hook on Africa. an ¡MF official was quoted as
stating that it is virtually impossible to assess the financial impact of
military expenditures cm development because most funding is done
outside normal channels, is considered off the hooks, and is
therefore never made available to the ¡MF. More often than not,
when the issue is pressed, figures are fabricated or reflect only
domestic military expenditures, not imports, so as to support
requests for balance-of-payments support from the fund
IArlinghaus ¡984: 571. The ¡MF official with whom 1 have spoken
was flot si) categorical. Emphasis was laid on the difficulty in
tracking down procurement pa\'mcnts, which tire often lumped
together with othee debts in budgets or aie made off-budget.
potential divergencies between the reporting of Third
World security ¿xpenditure by various sources can be
illustrated by comparing the Guyanese government's
figures for its security outlays in the period 1967-79
with data published by ACDA, the IMF and SIPRI.
(Guyana is chosen because it is one of the few
developing countries which provides breakdowns of
its actual outlays.) The ACDA figures clearly
correspond to the operating costs of the military forces
shown in the Guyanese figures rounded to the nearest
million, with the exception of 1979. This raises two
problems. The figure for 1978 is not for actual
expenditure, but for revised estimates. More serious,
ACDA data omit capital costs for all years and are
thus only partial expenditure figures. The IMF data
are also partial, because between 1967 and 1973 and in
1978 the IMF appears to have reported total outlays
on military forces only, even though its definition of
security expenditure includes outlays on paramilitary
forces. The Guyanese Police Force has paramilitary
duties, and expenditure on them should therefore have
been included. SIPRI, which generally does not
include paramilitary spending in its data, appears to
have reported expenditure on both the armed forces
and the police force in 1973. Thus, as these figures
from Guyana illustrate, while in many cases national
budgets do not reveal the entire extent of security
spending, they are sometimes more accurate than the
estimates produced by international bodies.
Many governments attempt to hide portions of their
security expenditure, for example by publishing only
one figure for security spending (these include
Pakistan, Botswana and Bangladesh), by trading
commodities directly for weapons to reduce procure-
ment costs in the budget (India), and by building up
extra-budgetary funds to finance a variety of security-
related outlays (Indonesia, Ecuador) [Ball 1984: 15-19].
At the same time, it is important to realise that
different estimates of a country's security expenditure
can arise without the government necessarily trying to
hide portions of its expenditure. For instance, there
can be genuine differences of opinion as to whether a
given item of expenditure should be categorised as
security related, as in different kinds of police
expenditure.
The way in which budgets are organised can also
produce problems. Not only are paramilitary forces
often to be found in the budget of the Interior
Ministry, but military-related construction is some-
times listed under departments of public works,
military pensions can be listed with state pensions for
civilian employees, and loans incurred to purchase
weapons are frequently listed under debt repayment.
Without access to a detailed government budget or
final expenditure account, a person compiling security
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expenditure figures runs a serious risk of producing
inaccurate and inconsistent data.
Nonetheless, budgets do not always reveal everything,
and the most serious problems in measuring security
expenditure still arise from the desire of governments
for concealment. In such situations, a detailed
knowledge of the country concerned and of what the
security sector says it is spending its money on, can
help to produce somewhat more accurate estimates of
the size of security budgets. In Nicaragua in the late
1970s, for example, when the Somoza government was
intensifying its military activities against the
Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan security budget showed a
surprisingly low level of outlays on weapons and
ammunition [BalI 1984: 228-91. The suspicion thus
inevitably arises that, even though the Nicaraguan
security budget nearly doubled between 1976 and
1978, some portions of security-related outlays were
concealed by the government. In Ecuador, it is widely
believed that the armed forces have the right to dispose
of 15 per cent of the country's annual income from the
petroleum industry. This money is additional to the
yearly allocation to the armed forces made through
the state budget. India is known to exchange certain
commodities and manufactures for Soviet weapons.
These transactions are recorded in as little detail as
possible in the balance of trade and are never entered
into the Indian budget. In spite of this, however, the
Indian security budget provides a good indication of
where the bulk of Indian security expenditure goes.3
Security Expenditure - the Implications
for Disarmament and Development
None of the major international series of security
expenditure figures has ever attempted to produce
disaggregated dat4. Nevertheless, more detailed
information on security spending has long been
recognised as a prerequisite for successful negotiations
on military expenditure reductions [UN Centre for
Disarmament 1981: 1, para. 5]. The United Nations
has called for the collection of disaggregated security
expenditure data, both through the UN Expert Group
on the Relationship between Disarmament and
Development and through the work of the Ad Hoc
Panel on Military Budgeting. Nevertheless, the Soviet
Union has succeeded in blocking the recommendation
of the UN Expert Group for information broken down
'in terms of personnel, administration, procurement,
research and development, capital investment'.4
-
Indian security expenditure is listed in several portions of the state
budgel. An extremely detailed account of by far the largest share of
the security budgel is published annually in Government of India.
Defence Services Estimates. Other portions of security spending can
be found in Combined Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Central
and Slate Governments in India and Explanatory Memorandunt oft/ic
Central Government.
Note transmitted to the Secretary-General from the Group of
Governmental Es-perIs on the Relationship hets'een Disarmament and
Deeelopment, Geneva: 26 January 1979, see Annex, pl.
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The work of the Ad Hoc Panel has, however, been
institutionalised. Each year the United Nations
requests Member Governments to submit information
on their security expenditures disaggregated according
to a matrix devised by the Panel in the late 1970s
[reproduced in UN 1981: 32-4]. To date, this effort has
not been notably successful as a means of collecting
information. Just over 30 countries have replied
during the five years that the reporting mechanism has
been in place. No Eastern-bloc country has ever
participated, and very few developing countries have
made information available. Nonetheless, this exercise
is valuable. If governments become accustomed to
reporting their security outlays on an annual basis,
this could be a first, albeit small, step toward serious
consideration of the need to place limitations on
security spending.
Although only a few Third World countries report
their security expenditures to the UN, the information
regularly published by governments in their own
budget documents brings out a number of facts
relevant to the discussion of disarmament and
development. For most people, Third World security
expenditure is synonymous with expenditure on
weapons and related services. One often hears
researchers, government officials and international
civil servants speak of 'arms spending' instead of
'military expenditure'. Most developing countries,
however, allocate surprisingly small amounts of their
security budgets to arms procurement. Operating
costs (personnel costs plus operations and maintenance
outlays) have always absorbed the largest portion of
Third World security spending. An examination of 20
developing countries between 1951 and 1979 indicates
that operating costs commonly account for 70-90 per
cent of total security, with personnel costs alone
typically absorbing between 50 and 70 per cent of the
entire security budget.5 Even if one were to assuPie
under-reporting of procurement budgets by as much
as 100 per cent, the proportion of their security
spending most countries devote to purchasing arms
would still be very small.
This finding is reinforced by a close examination of
arms trade statistics.6 While it is well known that the
volume and value of the arms trade increased
significantly during the 1970s, this trade was heavily
concentrated in a few countries. According to figures
produced by the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 8 countries received more than half of all
The data on operating costs are available in Ball 1984 and the data
on personnel costs are from the author's files. The 20 countries are:
india*, Iran, Malaysia°, Pakistan, Philippines5. Sri Lanka°,
Ghana, Liberia*. Malagasy Republic5. Morocco. Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Argentina, Brazil*. Chile. Colombia, Guyana. Nicaragua,
Trinidad and Tobago°, Veneeuela°. An asterisk indicates that
information on personnel costs was available.
weapons transferred to the Third World during the
1970s, while 20 countries accounted for nearly three-
quarters of the arms transferred. Approximately 90
developing countries imported about the same value
of weapons during the 1970s as just three countries,
namely Iran, Iraq and Syria.
This does not mean that the purchase of a small
amount of weapons cannot absorb a large portion of a
country's security budget. It does, however, make it
less likely that all developing countries regularly spend
most of their security budgets on arms. Even some of
the major arms importers, for example India, Brazil
and Cuba, spend very little of their security-related
resources on arms procurement. Cuba is said to
receive all of its weapons free of charge from the Soviet
Union. As explained above, India does not record all
its arms deals in its budget. However, even if it were
assumed that Indian security budgets understate arms
procurement by 100 per cent each year, the proportion
of Indian security spending absorbed by weapon
procurement (including expenditures on the domestic
arms industry) would have averaged between 10 and
15 per cent during the l960s and 1970s. For Brazil the
figure would perhaps be 10 per cent.
This pattern of expenditure reflects the fact that in
most countries the primary use of the security forces is
a domestic, political one. Underdevelopment is closely
associated with inequalities among and within
countries. Throughout the Third World, security
forces have become important both as mediators
between different elite groups and as guarantors of
elite-dominated political systems. The concentration
of political and economic power in the hands of a
small elite is an open invitation for the few,
distinguished by characteristics such as class,
ethnicity, religion and occupation, to exploit the
many. The resultant discontent causes governments to
arm themselves against their own people.
6 Arms transfer statistics are just as problematic as military
expenditure figures, if not more so. Furthermore, there are no
national figures with which to compare them, since trade and
balance of payments accounts do not categorise weapons imports
separately. Estimates of arms exports by the arms exporting
countries are of variable quality and do not always correspond with
the estimates made by ACDA and SIPRI. ACDA arms transfer data
do not reflect the entire value of arms transfers since, in addition to
what may inadvertently be excluded, ACDA omits the costs of
military-related construction, training and technical services. These
may be equivalent to somc 15 per cent of total arms transferred.
SI FRI arms transfer data are even less inclusive, since they cover
only major weapons. In addition, neither ACDA nor SIPRI data
can be taken as an indication of what the weapons imported actually
cost the recipient, since prices and terms of financing will vary
according to the political relationship between supplier and
purchaser. Some arms are transferred free-of-charge, with the cost
being absorbed by the supplier or by a third party (for example.
Saudi Arabia). Both ACDA and SIPRI data can. however, be used
to indicate trends. The accuracy and imitations of arms transfer
figures. ,re discussed in Brzoska 1982: 77-108.
The preponderance of operating costs and the
domestic political orientation of most security forces
suggests that it will be difficult to produce large
reductions in the level of security expenditure in the
Third World simply by imposing limitations on the
arms trade and by encouraging the peaceful resolution
of interstate conflicts, the two areas on which efforts at
the international level to reduce security spending tend
to concentrate. This is not to say that such proposals
are not in themselves desirable. On the contrary, fewer
conflicts would give the major powers less opportunity
to intervene in the affairs of developing countries. This
might result in lower security expenditure on the part
of the major powers and could reduce the external
threats confronting Third World governments, hope-
fully encouraging some of them to reduce their
security budgets. But unless domestic inequalities can
also be greatly reduced, sustained reductions in
security spending are unlikely.
The same factors also suggest that the development
dividends that can be anticipated from disarmament
may be initially rather small. It is clear that even a
large reduction in the procurement of weapons would
leave a very large proportion of Third World security
budgets untouched and would not produce sizeable
savings that could be translated into productive
investment. This is especially true when arms
purchases are financed by supplier or third-party
credits, since these credits would most likely not be
transferrable to the civil sector.
Similarly, fewer interstate wars would by no means
reduce the incentive to maintain security forces. This is
quite clearly demonstrated by South America where
there have been few active conflicts among countries
during the last century, but where security spending
continues to flourish. It can surely be no accident that
the concept of 'national security', which legitimises the
domestic role of the armed forces, was devised in
South America. (The Indonesian dwi fungsi (dual
function) doctrine and the Burmese 'National
Ideology of the Defence Services' were developed at
about the same time, but, as far as is known,
independently.)
It is crucial, however, that development analysts and
practitioners begin to take into account the economic
and political effects of security expenditure. In some
countries, the short-term economic costs of security
spending are important. The allocation of resources to
the security sector can contribute to high rates of
inflation, high levels of indebtedness, urban bias and
unfavourable trade balances, In other countries, the
economic effects are negligible. Hence it is important
to differentiate between countries and among time-
periods. Moreover the political effects of security
spending which influence the longer-term evolution
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of the economy - are usually negative. In situations
characterised by a high degree of political and
economic inequality, the main effect of security
spending is to strengthen the security forces at the
expense of other groups in society. The greater the
political power of the security forces, the more
difficult it is to effect change not approved by them.
Most security forces support the continuation of elite-
dominated systems rather than their replacement by
more participatory forms of government, because they
believe they stand to gain more, both personally and
professionally, from the former. The perpetuation of
elite-dominated systems reduces the likelihood that
political systems responsive to the needs of all citizens
- and not just a small proportion of them - will ever
be created. This situation can be changed with
sufficient pressure from the mass of the population,
but only over the long term and not if the armed forces
constantly intervene.
However, even if security expenditure were to decline
sharply, the security sector were to be substantially
reduced in size, and the armed forces were to leave the
political arena, this would not by itself guarantee
development. There are too many examples of
inefficient, corrupt, and uninterested civilian govern-
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ments in the Third World to warrant such an
optimistic conclusion. Yet the removal of the armed
forces from politics is a necessary first step.
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